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THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR CODE OF 1900.
EXPLANATION.
In the following pages the article or articles of the
Naval War Code npon which questions are raised or
upon which discussions are based will in each case pre-
cede the questions and discussions. The code as a whole
will be found at the end of the discussions, on pages
101-11-4. On the pages following the code will be found
the Instructions for the government of armies of the
United States in the field, pages 115-139; Convention
between the United States of America and certain
powers with respect to the laws and customs of war on
land (Hague Convention, proclaimed by the United
States April 11, 1903), pages 141-158; Convention for
the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of
the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1804 (proclaimed






The general object of war is to procure the complete
submission of the enemy at the earliest possible period,
with the least expenditure of life and property.
The special objects of maritime war are: The capture
or destruction of the military and naval forces of the
enemy; of his fortifications, arsenals, dry docks, and
dockyards; of his various military and naval establish-
ments, and of his maritime commerce: to prevent his
(13)
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procuring war material from neutral sources; to aid
and assist military operations on land, and to protect
and defend the national territory, property, and sea-
borne commerce.
(a) Would it be advisable to insert in Article 1 after
line 3 as the clause beginning line 4 the words, ' ' The
general object of maritime war is to deprive the enemy
of the use of the sea?"
The question in regard to the insertion of the words
"The general object of maritime war is to deprive the
enemy of the use of the sea" is raised in consequence of
the position taken by certain French writers. Logically,
there might be a statement of (l) the general object of
all war, (2) the general object of the phase of war of
which the code treats, (3) the special object of mari-
time war. Granting this arrangement, would the clause
cover the objects of maritime war at the present time?
Would it cover those measures which might be taken to
inflict injury upon land defenses, etc. ; or the measures
to cooperate with the army in various ways ?
In the first half of the nineteenth century the object
of maritime war was for the most part to deprive the
enemy of the use of the sea, but with the increase in the
use of steam, the lengthening range of guns, etc. , there
has come an enlargement of the field of maritime con-
trol and of the range of objects at which it aims.
The general object of maritime war is not different
from the general object of war as a whole. The field of
operations is somewhat restricted, however. , "The cap-
ture or destruction of the military and naval forces of the
enemy; of his fortifications, arsenals, dry docks, and
dockyards ; of his various military and naval establish-
ments, and of his maritime commerce; to prevent his
procuring war material from neutral sources ; to aid and
assist military operations on land, and to protect and
defend the national territory, property, and sea-borne
commerce," are stated as the objects of maritime war.
Yet some of these acts are no more the objects of mari-
time war in themselves than the killing of individuals
in uniform is the object of land warfare. These measures
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are such, as are allowed with view to attaining the sub-
mission of the enemy. The destruction of a fortification
or of commerce is not in itself the object of war, but
merely a means to attain the object, and by the first sec-
tion of this article should be reduced to the minimum,
i. e., there should be "the least expenditure of life and
property."
It is important to distinguish the object from the
justifiable means of attaining the object. There is a
growing tendency to penalize the nation which mistakes
the means for the end. Certain measures may be used
as contributory to the general object of war. Of course \
it will be difficult at times to determine what is contribu-
tory, but action that is distinctly not contributory even
though enumerated among the special objects, may not
be justifiable, and may be censured. Censure might
arise in consequence of the destruction of such a struc-
ture as a privately owned shipyard, provided such
destruction was not reasonably necessary to the ends of
the military or naval undertaking, though it might,
under conceivable circumstances, be of service to the
enemy.
The first part of Article 1 might well read: "The
general object of war is to procure the complete sub-
mission of the enemy at the earliest possible period with
the least expenditure of life and property."
1
' In maritime operations the usual measures for attai 1 1 -
ing this object are : The capture or destruction of the
military and naval forces of the enemy, etc."
(b) Would a dry dock within hostile territory, owned
and managed by a private company and sufficiently
large to receive a ship of war, be liable to the same
treatment as would fortifications and arsenals ?
The destruction of a dry dock owned and managed by
a private company would, from the context, not be
included in the same class as fortifications and arsenals,
which are distinctly classed as belonging to the enemy,
i. e., "of his fortifications, etc."
While a public dry dock would be liable to capture or
destruction, a private dry dock does not fall into this
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category until it becomes such as to afford aid to the
enemy. It may be in itself a commercial undertaking
of value in peace and not specially designed for war, as
would be the case of an arsenal or fortification.
The capture of the privately owned dry dock would
of course be entirely justifiable at any time as a measure
of war. The destruction is not justifiable under the
same provision as that in regard to arsenals and fortifi-
cations, which are public and by nature adapted for
war ; but being private, if destruction be permissible at
all, it must be based on Article 3, which, following the
majority of authorities, would allow such an act if
justified by a reasonable military necessity. Article
XXIII (g) of The Hague Convention, with respect to
the laws and customs of war on land, prohibits the
destruction or seizure of " enemy's property unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war." Taylor, in his recent book, Inter-
national Public Law, page 547, says: " Private property
according to existing rules is treated even more favora-
bly than that of the public. Except in extreme cases,
to be mentioned hereafter, it is both respected and pro-
tected. At The Hague it was declared that family
honor and rights, individual lives and private property,
as well as religious liberty and worship, must be re-
spected. Private property can not be confiscated. " l 'All
private property, even that of the individual sovereign,
is now respected, at least in theory, and booty therein
is not permitted. As Zacharia expresses it, private prop-
erty of the enemy can be touched only so far as the
necessities of war require, for it is part of the war power
of its country only so far as that country could itself
exercise dominion over it."
Of course a commanding officer must himself judge as
to whether a military necessity exists. To destroy the
privately owned dry dock, except from military neces-
sity, would constitute "wanton devastation" forbidden
by Article 3 of the Naval War Code.
(c) How would a pleasure yacht be treated under the
provisions of Article 1 ?
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• This question is raised because Article 25 specifies
"merchant vessels, yachts, or neutral vessels," seeming
to create a distinct class. The interpretation that has
been given to the word "commerce" under the Consti-
tution would probably be sufficiently wide to include
pleasure yachts, but not if they are placed in a class by
themselves. Hence, under Article 1, as interpreted with
view to Article 25 and some of the earlier articles in
Section IV as, e. g., Article 14, a pleasure yacht would
not be included.
It would therefore have to be captured if at all under
Article 3, which would be very difficult of application,
because the proof of military necessity in the capture of
a pleasure yacht would not be easy and often would be
impossible. Hence, some provision should be made
elsewhere in the code for such capture which may be as
desirable as the capture of a merchant vessel. This will
be introduced later.
(d) One further measure for attaining the objects of
war which is becoming of more and more importance is
the cutting off of the means of communication between
the enemy and the outside world. It is therefore de-
cided that the words "and communications" be added
after the words ' ' maritime commerce. " To avoid possible
confusion, it would further be advisable to insert in-
stead of the words "to aid and assist" the words "to co-
operate with the Army in" so that the clause would read
"to cooperate with the Army in military operations on
land."
Article 1 as revised would therefore read:
The general object of war is to procure the complete submission
of the enemy at the earliest possible period, with the least expendi-
ture of life and property.
In maritime operations the usual measures for attaining this object
are: To capture or destroy the military and naval forces of the
enemy; his fortifications, arsenals, dry docks, and dockyards; his
various military and naval establishments, and his maritime com-
merce and communications;—to prevent his procuring war material
from neutral sources;—to cooperate with the Army in military
operations on land, and to protect and defend the national territory,




The above form, was agreed upon as covering essential
amendments provided Article 1 be retained in the code.
It was, however, the general opinion
—
1. That the article served no essential purpose because
the general object of war is well known and needs no
definition and the measures of maritime warfare vary
with circumstances.
2. That it might tend to restrict an officer in the ex-
ercise of Lis functions rather than make these more
clear to him.
A majority of the officers in attendance upon the con-
ference were of the opinion that Article 1 should be
stricken out entirely.
Article 2.
The area of maritime warfare comprises the high seas
or other waters that are under no jurisdiction, and the
territorial waters of belligerents. Neither hostilities
nor any belligerent right, such as that of visitation and
search, shall be exercised in the territorial waters of
neutral States.
The territorial waters of a State extend seaward to the
distance of a marine league from the low-water mark of
its coast line. They also include, to a reasonable extent,
which is in many cases determined by usage, adjacent
parts of the sea, such as bays, gulfs, and estuaries in-
closed within headlands; and where the territory by
which they are inclosed belongs to two or more States,
the marine limits of such States are usually defined by
conventional lines.
How should such a body of water as Long Island Sound
be regarded under the provisions of Article 2 ?
This situation does not from the point of view of the
United States admit of discussion. It is the established
rule that such waters as Long Island Sound are terri-
torial waters of the United States. The jurisdiction
over gulfs and bays having a mouth considerably over
6 miles wide is still open to difference of opinion. Hall
briefly summarizes the current opinion as follows
:
In any case the custom of regarding a line three miles from land as
defining the boundary of marginal territorial waters is so far fixed
that a state must be supposed to accept it in the absence of express
notice that a larger extent is claimed.
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The question of the principle upon which the extent of marginal
waters should be founded and of the breadth of water that should be
included, has of late attracted a considerable amount of attention.
It is felt, and growingly felt, not only that the width of three miles is
insufficient for the safety of the territory, but that it is desirable for a
state to have control over a larger space of water for the purpose of
regulating and preserving the fishery in it, the productiveness of sea
fisheries being seriously threatened by the destructive methods of
fishing which are commonly employed, and in many places by the
greatly increased number of fishing vessels frequenting the grounds.
After being carefully studied and reported upon by a Committee
of the Institut de Droit International, the subject was exhaustively
discussed by the Institut at its meeting in Paris, in 1894, the exception-
ally large number of thirty-ninemembers being present. With regard
to the necessity of ascribing a greater breadth than three miles of terri-
torial water to the littoral state there was no difference of opinion.
As to the extent to which the marginal belt should be enlarged, and
the principle upon which enlargement should be based, the same
unanimity was not manifested, but ultimately it was resolved by a
large majority that a zone of six marine miles from low-water mark
ought to be considered territorial for all purposes, and that in time
of war a neutral state should have the right to extend this zone by
declaration of neutrality or by notification, for all purposes of
neutrality, to a distance from the shore corresponding to the extreme
range of cannon. (International Law, 4th ed., p. 160 and note.)
Article 3.
Military necessity permits measures that are indis-
pensable for securing the ends of the war and that are
in accordance with modern laws and usages of war.
It does not permit wanton devastation, the use of
poison, or the doing of any hostile act that would make
the return of peace unnecessarily difficult.
Noncombatants are to be spared in person and prop-
erty during hostilities, as much as the necessities of war
and the conduct of such noncombatants will permit.
The launching of projectiles and explosives from bal-
loons, or by other new methods of a similar nature, is
prohibited for a term of five years by the Declaration
of The Hague, to which the United States became a
party. This rule does not apply when at war with a
noncontracting Power.
(a) In Article 3, line 4, should the clause "the use of
poison" be stricken out?
The first clause, "military necessity permits," etc..
provides that only such measures shall be used as are
in accord "with modern laws and usages of war."
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If there is one measure that is fully understood to be
forbidden by the modern laws and usages of war, it is
"the use of poison." This is forbidden by all codes.
(See Hague Convention with respect to the laws and
customs of war on land, Art. 23.) There is no more
reason for insertion of "the use of poison " than of many
other clauses; indeed less, because the use of poison is
more generally forbidden than almost any other act.
The clause should therefore be stricken out unless other
specifications are to be introduced.'
(b) In the same place, should the following be in-
serted? "The destruction of great public works pri-
marily and mainly intended to promote commerce."
There has been much discussion upon the advisability
of forbidding the destruction of "great public works
primarily and mainly intended to promote commerce."
The Suez Canal already has a quasi neutralization.
By the Convention of 1888 it was agreed that a system
should be established to "guarantee at all times, and
for all the powers, the free use of the Suez maritime
canal." The articles showing the nature of this agree-
ment as touching Article 3 of the Naval War Code are
as follows •
ARTICLE I.
The Suez maritime canal shall always be free and open, in time
of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war,
without distinction of flag.
Consequently, the high contracting parties agree not in any way
to interfere with the free use of the canal, in time of war as in time
of peace.
The canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of
blockade.
ARTICLE IV.
The maritime canal remaining open in time of war as a free pas-
sage, even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms
of Article 1 of the present treaty, the high contracting parties agree
that no right of war shall be exercised, nor shall any act of hostility,
or any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of
the canal, be committed in the canal and its ports of access, nor
within a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, even though the
Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent powers.
Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in stores
in the canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may be strictly
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necessary. The transit of the aforesaid vessels through the canal
shall be effected with the least possible delay, in accordance with
the regulations in force, and without any other intermission than
that resulting from the necessities of the service.
Their stay at Port Said and in the roadstead of Suez shall not ex-
ceed twenty-four hours, except in case of distress. In such case they
shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of twenty-
four hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent
ship from one of the ports of access and the departure of a ship
belonging to the hostile power.
ARTICLE V.
In time of war belligerent powers shall not disembark nor embark
within the canal and its ports of access either troops, munitions,
or materials of war. But in case of an accidental hindrance in the
canal, men may be embarked or disembarked at the ports of access
by detachments not exceeding 1,000 men, with a corresponding
amount of war material.
ARTICLE VI.
Prizes shall be subject, in all respects, to the same rules as the
vessels of war of belligerents.
ARTICLE VII.
The powers shall not keep any vessel of war in the waters of the
canal (including Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes)
.
Nevertheless, they may station vessels of war in the ports of ac-
cess of Port Said and Suez, the number of which shall not exceed
two for each power.
This right shall not be exercised by belligerents. (Holland. Studies
in International Law, p. 289.)
It is proposed to give to the Panama or any similar
great commercial undertaking exemption because an
easily inflicted injury might destroy the work of years
without giving to the belligerent any corresponding
military advantage, e. g., the breaking of a dam which
might flood or destroy much of the work on the Panama
Canal.
If the United States constructs the canal without any
provision for neutralization other than that in the Ha\ -
Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, which is binding on Great
Britain and the United States, some provision in regard
to great public works might be desirable, provided other
nations agree to the same rule. The advisability of an
international agreement in regard to such great public
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works is admitted, but it would not be advisable for the
United States to forbid its officers action which other
states do not deny to their officers.
Therefore the provisions of this clause as it stands,
omitting "the use of poison," because that is covered
by general rules, should stand.
(c) Under the provisions of the clause beginning
" Noncombatants are to be spared," etc., should an un-
armed dispatch boat be treated in any respects differ-
ently from an armored enemy's vessel; if so, in what
respect ?
The vessel is liable to treatment as a vessel engaged
in the service of the enemy. In respect to the vessel,
this case falls under the first paragraph of Article 13,
and in respect to the personnel, under Article 10 of the
code, which are as follows
:
Art. 13. All public vessels of the enemy are subject to capture,
except those engaged in purely charitable or scientific pursuits, in
voyages of discovery, or as hospital ships under the regulations
hereinafter mentioned.
Art. 10. The personnel of all public unarmed vessels of the
enemy, either owned or in his service as auxiliaries, are liable, upon
capture, to detention as prisoners of war.
(//) In the application of The Hague rule in regard
to the launching of projectiles and explosives, what
would be the effect if an enemy contracting party
should make an offensive and defensive alliance with
a noncontracting party ?
This rule would cease to be binding. This portion of
the code should read
:
By the Declaration of The Hague, signed July 29, 1899, to which
the United States is a party, it is provided that:
The contracting powers agree to prohibit, for a term of five
years, the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons, or
by other new methods of similar nature.
The present Declaration is only binding on the contracting pow-
ers in case of war between two or more of them.
It shall cease to be binding from the time when in a war between
the contracting powers one of the belligerents is joined by a non-
contracting power.
(e) Should this Hague rule be renewed at the expira-
tion of the five-year period ?
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The reasons for the limitation of the period to five
years are shown in the report of The Hague Conference,
made by the late Mr. Holls
:
On the subject of balloons, the subcommittee first voted a per-
petual prohibition of their use, or that of similar new machines, for
throwing projectiles or explosives. In the full committee, on mo-
tion of Captain Crozier, the prohibition was unanimously limited
to cover a period of five years only. The action taken was for
humanitarian reasons alone, and was founded upon the opinion that
balloons, as they now exist, form so uncertain a means of injury
that they can not be used with accuracy. The persons or objects
injured by throwing explosives may be entirely disconnected from
the conflict, and such that their injury or destruction would be of
no practical advantage to the party making use of the machines.
The limitation of the prohibition to five years' duration preserves
liberty of action under such changed circumstances as may be pro-
duced by the progress of invention. (The Peace Conference at The
Hague, p. 95.)
The reasons that applied at the time of the Peace
Conference are eqnally valid at the present time ; there-
fore the article, as cited nnder (d) above, from present
indications, shonld be renewed.
Article Jf.
The bombardment, by a naval force, of unfortified and
undefended towns, villages, or buildings is forbidden,
except when such bombardment is incidental to the
destruction of military or naval establishments, public
depots of munitions of war, or vessels of war in port,
or unless reasonable requisitions for provisions and sup-
plies essential, at the time, to such naval vessel or vessels
are forcibly withheld, in which case due notice of bom-
bardment shall be given.
The bombardment of unfortified and undefended
towns and places for the nonpayment of ransom is
forbidden.
(a) Would it not be more strictly correct and in
accord with the best opinion so to amend Article 4 as
to read
:
The bombardment by a naval force of unfortified and undefended
towns, villages, or buildings is forbidden, though such towns, vil-
lages, or buildings are liable to the damages incidental to the
destruction of military or naval establishments, public depots of
munitions of war, or vessels of war in port, and such towns.
villages, or buildings are liable to direct bombardment when rea-
sonable requisitions for provisions and supplies at the time essential
to the naval force are withheld, in which case due notice of bom-
bardment shall be given.
The rules adopted by the Institute of International
Law at Venice, 189(3, provide:
Art. 1. There is no difference between the rules of the law of
war as to bombardment by military forces on land and that by
naval forces.
The Hague Convention, with respect to the laws and
customs of war on land, provides
:
Art. XXV. The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, hab-
itations, or buildings which are not defended is prohibited.
Art. XXVI. The commander of an attacking force, before com-
mencing a bombardment, except in the case of an assault, should
do all he can to warn the authorities.
Art. XXVII. In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps
should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to religion,
art, science, and charity, hospitals and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, provided they are not used at the same time
for military purposes.
The besieged should indicate these buildings or places by some
particular and visible signs, which should previously be notified to
the assailants.
The situation is, however, somewhat different in
bombardment by land forces. It is evident, however,
that it was not the intent that these rules of The Hague
Convention should apply to naval warfare, as the con-
clusions of The Hague Conference contain, in the
seventh resolution, the following statement : "The Con-
ference expresses the wish that the proposition of regu-
lating the question of bombardment of ports, cities, or
villages by a naval force should be referred for exami-
nation to another conference."
As Article 4 of the code now reads, it has been held
that unfortified and. undefended towns may be bom-
barded directly, when such direct bombardment is a
part of a more general attempt at the destruction of
military or naval establishments, public depots of
munitions of war, etc. It has been held that such
bombardment might be undertaken upon a given day
with the expectation that at some future time the
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"military or naval establishments," etc., would be
bombarded.
Such action would not be permissible, however, ac-
cording to the best opinion of modern times. Bombard-
ment can only be aimed at ' ' military or naval estab-
lishments," etc., as named in Article 4. The "unfortified
and undefended towns, villages, or buildings" may
without direct intention be injured in the fire incidental
to such bombardment. Such injury can not be called
bombardment of the "towns, villages, or buildings."
It should be observed that a single act of forcible
resistance to an order of a properly authorized military
officer may constitute defense. A town, village, or
dwelling may thus easily pass from an undefended to a
defended condition.
The requisition for supplies must be reasonable and
must be properly made. The characteristics of such
action are indicated by the Hague Convention with
respect to the laws and customs of war on land.
Art. LII. Neither requisition in kind nor services can be demanded
from communes or inhabitants, except for the necessities of the
army of occupation. They must be in proportion to the resources
of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the popula-
tion in the obligation of taking part in military operations against
their country.
These requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the
authority of the commander in the locality occupied.
The contributions in kind shall, as far as possible, be paid for in
ready money; if not, their receipt shall be acknowledged.
To avoid possible misinterpretation, the clause should
read: "The bombardment, by a naval force, of unforti-
fied and undefended towns, villages, or buildings is for-
bidden, though such towns, villages, or buildings are
liable to the damages incidental to the destruction of
military or naval establishments, public depots of mu-
nitions of war, or vessels of war in port, and such towns,
villages, or buildings are liable to bombardment when
reasonable requisitions for provisions and supplies at the
time essential to the naval force are withheld, in which
case due notice of bombardment shall be given."
26
(b) Should the clause "The bombardment of unforti-
fied and undefended towns and places for the nonpay-
ment of ransom is forbidden," be stricken out?
The clause "The bombardment of unfortified and
undefended towns and places for the nonpayment of
ramsom is forbidden " should be retained as a part of
the code. The matter of such bombardment has been
recently and quite fully » discussed before this Naval
War College by Prof. John Bassett Moore and will
be found in the publications of the Naval War College,
International Law Situations with Solutions and Notes,
1901, pages 5-37. Latest opinion and practice alike
support the retention of this clause of Article 4.
(c) Should a clause to the effect that "An open town
which is defended against the entrance of troops or dis-
embarked marines may be bombarded in order to pro-
tect the landing of soldiers and marines if the open
town attempts to prevent it, and as an auxiliary measure
of war, in order to facilitate an assault made by the
troops and the disembarked marines, if the town defends
itself," be inserted?
The insertion of such a provision is unnecessary, as
"an open town" which is in the position described is no
longer "an open town" in the sense of an undefended
town, which is the town exempt by Article 4; therefore
the town, by defense against the entrance of troops or
disembarked marines, becomes liable to the military
operations which might include bombardment if cir-
cumstances made it necessary.
(d) Would bombardment of an open town be justi-
fiable in case a division of the enemy's army occupies
the town and refuses to surrender on demand of the
' United States naval force?
The Institute of International Law, in its session in
September, 189G, adopted the following regulation
:
An open town may not be exposed to bombardment by the sole
fact:
1. That it is the capital of a state or the seat of government (but,
naturally, these circumstances give it no guarantee against bom-
bardment) .
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2. That it is actually occupied by troops, or that it is ordinarily
garrisoned by troops of various arms, destined to rejoin the army
in time of war.
This rule, if generally accepted, would not cover the
case under consideration, however, for the occupancy
by the enemy's troops is not the sole fact nor even the
important fact in this case. The important fact is that
an armed force refuses on demand to surrender, and the
fact that it remains in "an open town" in name, can not
exempt the town or force from the necessary military
measures. The town, in fact, becomes defended under
these circumstances and is liable to treatment as such a
town.
(e) The harbor of an unfortified town is supposed to
contain submarine mines making entry dangerous.
The commanding officer of the United States naval
forces requests assurances in regard to the condition of
the harbor. This is refused. Is the officer justified in
bombarding the town in order to obtain an answer or
as a measure of war?
The refusal to give information or assurances to the
commanding officer leaves him no alternative other
than to assume that the town is defended against ap-
proach from the sea. Such being the case, he is justified
in bombarding the town after due notice, either in
order to obtain an answer to his reasonable request for
information or as a measure of war.
Article 5.
The following rules are to be followed with regard to
submarine telegraphic cables in time of war, irrespective
of their ownership
:
(a) Submarine telegraphic cables between points in
the territory of an enemy, or between the territory of
the United States and that of an enemy, are subject to
such treatment as the necessities of war may require.
(6) Submarine telegraphic cables between the terri-
tory of an enemy and neutral territory maybe inter-
rupted within the territorial jurisdiction of the enemy.
(c) Submarine telegraphic cables between two nent ra]
territories shall be held inviolable and free from inter-
ruption.
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(a) Should the clause, "or at any point outside of
neutral jurisdiction, if the necessities of war require,"
be added to (b) under Article 5?
After consideration of recent practice and the discus-
sions in regard to the treatment of submarine telegraphic
cables, it would seem best to elaborate the first clause
of Article 5. It was evidently not intended to require
that the provisions of Article 5 should be followed inva-
riably. Accordingly the first clause should read as
follows : " Unless under satisfactory censorship or other-
wise exempt, the following rules are established with
regard to the treatment of submarine telegraphic cables
in time of war, irrespective of their ownership."
Clauses (a) and (c) are generally accepted as correct
statements of the rules to be followed in case of cables
connecting belligerent points on the one hand and neu-
tral points on the other.
The situation involved in clause (b), "Submarine
telegraphic cables between the territory of an enemy
and neutral territory may be interrupted within the
territorial jurisdiction of the enemy," in various forms
has been much discussed. It has been claimed that a
submarine telegraphic cable between the terrritory of
an enemy and neutral territory (1) should not be inter-
rupted under any conditions, (2) could be interrupted
only within the three-mile limit, (3) could be interrupted
only when the belligerent landing place was under effect-
ive blockade, and (4) could be interrupted at any point
outside of neutral jurisdiction if military necessity
required such interruption. Others would modify some
of these provisions further according to ownership, loca-
tion, etc.
The subject of the treatment of submarine telegraphic
cables was quite fully considered in the report of the
Interdepartmental Committee on Cable Communica-
tions, made to the English Parliament, March 26, 1902.
The Institute of International Law also gave the subject
much attention at its meeting in September, 1902. The
English committee admits that arrangements should be
made ' ' on the supposition that a considerable propor-
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tion of cables will be cut," and that "it will be the
interest of the belligerents to interrupt or control, by
censorship, the telegraphic cornmunications of their
adversaries, even to the degree of occasioning detriment
to neutrals and of incurring liability to make compen-
sation to them for arbitrary interference with their
cables." (Certain phases of the subject of the treatment
of submarine telegraphic cables in time of war were
discussed in the International Law Situations, Naval
War College, 1902, pp. 7-20.)
At the session of the Institute of International Law
in 1902 the question of the treatment of submarine tele-
graphic cables in time of war received much attention.
Bearing upon the case of cables connecting neutral and
belligerent territory, Von Bar, one of the German repre-
sentatives, advanced the following proposition:
Comme les pays neutres ont le droit de communiquer librenient
avec les belligerants, les seuls titres admissibles pour entraver ou
couper cette communication libre etant le blocns effectif et l'occu-
pation militaire, il y a lieu de tirer les conclusions suivantes:
(a) Le cable sous-marin reliant un territoire neutre aun territoire
appartenant a une des parties en guerre ne peut etre coupe par un
des belligerants que dans les cas suivants:
En pleinemer ou dans la mer territoriale de l'Etat ennemi, s'il y
a blocus effectif et que ce blocus embrasse le rayon ou se trouw
le cable;
Dans le territoire ennemi meme, si l'endroit de la cote ou aboutit
ou l'ile ou passe le cable est occupe, soit pour un temps prolon.uv.
soit momentanement, par la partie belligerante.
En dehors de ces cas, le cable en question est inviolable en pleine
mer comme dans la mer territoriale de la partie ennemie.
(6) Le droit de s'emparer et de profiter du cable en question
n'existe que dans les cas ou il y a droit de le couper.
(c) II n'y a pas de difference a etablir, quant au droit d'un Etat
belligerant de couper un cable sous-marin ou del'exploiter, entre les
cables exploites par un gouvernement neutre et les cables exploites
par des compagnies privees concessionnaires.
(cl) Dans les*cas precites ou existe le droit de l'Etat belligerant de
couper un cable sous-marin ou de s'en emparer autremcnt, aucun
dedommagement du chef de l'exercice de ce droit n'est du a la com-
pagnie ni a l'Etat a qui appartient le cable, ni aux personnea qui
auraient fait cabler des depeches. (Annuaire de L'lnstitnt de Dr< >ir
International, 19, 1902, p. 12.)
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Von Bar further says (p. 16)
:
II me semble pourtant, sans qu'il soit necessaire de faire usage de
la theorie du droit d'angarie, droit douteux et souvent conteste,
que Ton peut poser simplement comme regie generale que les Etats
neutres, et de meme leurs sujets, ont le droit de communiquer libre-
ment aveo l'une et l'autre des parties belligerantes et leurs terri-
toires, et qu'on ne doit reconnaitre a cette regie que deux exceptions,
dont l'une se fonde sur I 'occupation militaire et l'autre sur le droit
de blocus.
Comme la pleine mer ne peut etre occupee, il ne peut etre permis
de couper un cable servant de communication entre un pays neutre
et un territoire ennemi, et comme le blocus, pour donner le droit
d'interrompre les communications des neutres avec l'ennemi, doit
etre effect if , il n'y a pas lieu d'etendre 1'exception de maniere a
permettre la destruction d'un cable en pleine mer a la seule condi-
tion que cela se fasse a une distance du territoire ennemi ou un
blocus peut etre exerce, mais n'est pas pratique reellement.
La question speciale la plus delicate est peut-etre celle de savoir
si TEtat belligerant a le droit de couper des cables reliant un terri-
toire neutre a un territoire ennemi dans les eaux territoriales de
l'ennemi. II semble juste de faire dependre la solution de la possi-
bilite d'une occupation reelle. Dans les eaux territoriales, soumises
completement a la souverainete de l'Etat et, de ce chef, pouvant
etre occupees reellement, ce droit existe. Mais il n'existe pas quant
a la mer territoriale dans le sens des resolutions de Tlnstitut de 1894
(Annuaire, 13, p. 329) (" Kiistenmeer "), cette partie de la mer
n'etant pas completement soumise a la souverainete exclusive de
l'Etat riverain, et servant, au contraire, au commerce general et
libre du monde entier.
Renault, one of the French members, disagreed with
Yon Bar, saying, that while agreeing with (&), (c), (f?),
above, he did not agree with (a).
Dans le cas d'un cable sous-marin reliant un territoire neutre au
territoire de l'un des belligerants, j'admets pour l'autre belligerant
le droit de couper le cable, soit sur le territoire ou dans les eaux
territoriales de son adversaire, soit meme en pleine mer.
Je ne distingue pas suivant qu'il y a ou non blocus. (Annuaire
1902, p. 18.)
Other propositions were advanced. Professor Hol-
land, of Oxford, offered the following (p. 301)
:
1. Le cable telegraphique sous-marin, unissant deux territoires
neutres, est inviolable. (Institut de Droit international, 1879.)
2. Le cable reliant les territoires de deux belligerants ou deux
parties du territoire d'un des belligerants peut etre coupe partout,
excepte dans les eaux territoriales neutres.
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3. Le cable reliant un territoire neutre a un territoire appartenant
a un des belligerants ne peut etre coupe que dans les eaux terri-
toriales de ce belligerant.
4. En ce qui concerne 1'application des regies precedentes, il n'y
a de difference a etablir, ni entre les cables d'Etat et les cables
appartenant a des individus, ni entre les cables de propriete ennemie
et ceux qui sont de propriete neutre.
5. Quand la coupure d'un cable est permise selon les regies piv<V-
dentes, aucune indemnity n'est due aux proprietaires ennemis du
cable pour cet acte, accompli comme operation de guerre. (Les
prescriptions de l'article 53 de la Convention de La Haye ne sont
pas applicables a ce cas.)
6. Au contraire, le belligerant qui a coupe un cable de propriete
neutre (soit d'Etat, soit d'individus), dans l'exercice d'un droit
analogue au jus angariae [ou de visite en haute mer (1)], est tenu
des frais de reparation. II n'est pas tenu d'indemniser les proprie-
taires pour la perte de leurs benefices. (Annuaire 1902, p. 301.)





Le cable telegraphique sous-niarin reliant des territoires neutres
est inviolable.
2. La liberte d'action des belligerants n'est pas restreinte, si le
cable relie leurs territoires respectifs ou deux points du territoire
d'un seul des belligerants.
3. Pour le cas ou le cable relierait le territoire d'un belligerant et
le territoire d'un neutre, une reglementation generale n'est pas
possible actuellement. Les mesures a prendre dependront, selon
les circonstances, des operations rnilitaires; elles ne dependent nulle-
ment du droit de propriete des cables.
Dans l'interet du commerce international, il estcependant desira-
ble de ne detruire ou interrompre la communication telegraphique
que si la necessity militaire l'exige.
Rolin, editor of the Revue de droit international et de
legislation comparee made the following proposition
(p. 317):
Le cable sous-marin reliant un territoire neutre a un territoire
appartenant a une des parties en guerre ne pourra en aucun cas
etre coupe par un des belligerants dans les eaux territorial is on
neutralisees dependant d'un territoire neutre.
H pourra etre coupe, selon les necessites des operations militaitf
sur le territoire et dans les eaux territoriales de l'ennenii.
H pourra egalement etre coupe en pleine mer, si apres avoir
notifie a l'Etat neutre l'interdiction de transmettre des depeches,
etc. * * *
Upon a vote of the Institute of International Law in
1902, as to whether it should be absolutely forbidden to
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interrupt in the high sea a cable uniting a belligerent
and a neutral, 14 favored absolute prohibition of inter-
ruption of such cable in the high sea, 17 opposed such
prohibition, and 1 did not vote. A subsequent vote
showed that although the institute was not in favor of
absolute prohibition of interruption of cables in the
high sea, it was not, therefore, of the opinion that the
right to interrupt was unlimited.
Finally the institute, 19 voting in the affirmative,
6 in the negative, and 4 not voting, adopted the follow-
ing (p. 331)
:
REGLES CONCERNANT LES CABLES SOUS-MARINS EN TEMPS DE GUERRE.
I. Le cable sous-marin reliant deux territoires neutres est in-
violable.
II. Le cable reliant les territoires de denx belligerants ou deux
parties du territoire d'un des belligerants peut etre coupe partout,
excepte dans la mer territoriale et dans les eaux neutralisees
dependant d'un territoire neutre ("neutralisees " par traite ou par
declaration conformement a 1'article 4 des resolutions de Paris de
1894).
III. Le cable reliant un territoire neutre au territoire d'un des
belligerants ne peut en aucun cas etre coupe dans la mer territoriale
ou dans les. eaux neutralisees dependant d'un territoire neutre.
En haute mer, ce cable ne peut etre coupe que s'il y a blocus
effectif et dans les limites de la ligne du blocus, sauf retablissenient
du cable dans le plus bref delai possible. Ce cable peut toujours
etre coupe sur le territoire et dans la mer territoriale dependant
d'un territoire ennemi jusqu'a une distance de trois milles marins
de la laisse de basse-maree.
IV. II est entendu que la liberte de l'Etat neutre de transmettre
des depeches n'implique pas la faculte d'en user ou d'en permettre
l'usage manifestement pour preter assistance a l'un des belligerants.
V. En ce qui concerne l'application des regies precedentes, il n'y
a de difference a etablir ni entre les cables d'Etat et les cables appar-
tenant a des particuliers, ni entre les cables de propriete ennemie et
ceux qui sont de propriete neutre.
The above rules are in some respects more exact than
those of the Naval War Code, though, as the discus-
sions show, not wholly satisfactory to members of the
Institute.
The first rule is essentially the same as that of the
Naval War Code.
The second rule contains a provision protecting a
cable which connects belligerent in so far as it is
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actually within neutral jurisdiction. This is covered
by Article 2 of the Naval War Code, however.
The third rule is more detailed and specific than the
provisions of the Naval War Code, which is that "Sub-
marine telegraphic cables between the territory of an
enemy and neutral territory may be interrupted within
the territorial jurisdiction of the enemy." The rules
of the institute cover this point in the last clause of this
third rule. In regard to this provision of the Naval
War Code, the statement is that such cables may be cut
within enemy jurisdiction, and not that they are not
to be cut elsewhere. It is certain that such a cable
should not be interrupted by any act which itself shall
take place within neutral jurisdiction. It would not,
of course, be allowable for any belligerent to cut any
cable within the three-mile limit of a neutral state.
There is then left entirely undetermined the status of
cables between an enemy and a neutral so far as they
lie in the high seas.
If cables between neutrals and belligerents can be cut
only within the jurisdiction of the belligerent, it would
be good policy for a belligerent to see that, so far as
possible, immediately on the outbreak of hostilities a
neutral landing place be interposed between the termini
of all his cables or to make provision for neutral landing
places in their original construction, thus leaving only
the guardianship of the cable line within the three-mile
limit for the belligerent's cruisers. This would probably
not be maintained seriously in a case necessitating the
cutting of a cable, even beyond the three-mile limit, or,
as was maintained in the Spanish-American war, "the
limit of the range of the enemy's gun." (Wilson, Sub-
marine Telegraphic Cables in their International Rela-
tions. Lectures, Naval War College, Newport, L901,
p. 32.)
Further, it may be said: "This code does not, however,
cover the debatable points in regard to cables which arc
beyond the three-mile limit or other limits of jurisdictioD
of a belligerent and the same limits of a neutral stair.
The status of such cables must be determined, \'<>v the
20681 3
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present, by reference to general principles and the
tendency is to so determine their status. This is neces-
sary because great injury might be done to one or both
of the belligerents if the laws of different states might
say what was proper service in the time of war, as was
formerly thought to be possible unless a convention was
adopted among the leading states. If the material of
which the cable is to be made is liable to seizure and
confiscation on the high sea in the time of war, then it
is not too much to claim that the cable itself, when in
full operation, is liable to the consequences of war under
like circumstances." (Ibid, p. 37.)
The rule of the Institute tries to cover the treatment
of cables beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the bel-
ligerent by specifying that only within the limits of
effective blockade is cutting allowable. The fourth rule
introduces an idea, which, if carried out, would make all
cutting unnecessary, for it is only to prevent the trans-
mission of hostile messages that cutting is necessary
within the territorial jurisdiction of the enemy, within
blockade lines, or at any other point. The destruction
of a harmless cable would be prohibited as wanton
devastation. It will be evident that if the fourth rule
can be enforced the third will be unnecessary, because
a cable of this class would not be used for hostile pur-
poses. If the fourth rule is not enforced, the limitation
of cutting to the places specified in the third rule
becomes arbitrary.
The fourth of these rules in regard to cables adopted
by the Institute states that "It is intended that the
liberty of the neutral state to transmit dispatches shall
not involve the right to use or to permit their use, mani-
festly for lending aid to one of the belligerents." This
rule does not, however, provide any means for the pre-
vention of the use which is forbidden.
If a submarine cable connecting one belligerent and a
neutral state is used to aid that belligerent, the other
belligerent doubtless has a right to prevent such use in
any reasonable manner provided he does not thereby
violate neutral territory or neutral rights. This fourth
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rule provides that the neutral has no right to permit the
cable to be used manifestly to aid one of the belligerents.
If the neutral does not prevent such use, then the other
belligerent impliedly must take action. The action
most feasible and certain is often the cutting of the
cable outside of neutral jurisdiction. Therefore, if mil-
itary necessity justifies such action, it may be taken.
The officer responsible for the interruption must realize
that he assumes the responsibility and that this respon-
sibility should be assumed only when based on military
necessity. As M. Renault well said in the discussion,
"II faut qu'a des moyens d'attaque nouveaux correspon-
dent des moyens de defense nouveaux: le moyen d'at-
taque etant devenu plus rapide et plus dangereux, le
moyen de defense peut devenir plus dur, puisque autre-
ment il n'y aurait plus aucun moyen de defense du tout.' ,
(Annuaire, 1902, p. 314.)
Pending an international agreement, the following-
wording would meet the requirements of the United
States Navy, while giving reasonable guarantee as to
the observance of neutral rights
:
Art. 5. Unless under satisfactory censorship or otherwise exempt,
the following rules are established with regard to the treatment of
submarine telegraphic cables in time of war, irrespective of their
ownership:
(a) Submarine telegraphic cables between points in the territory
of an enemy, or between the territory of the United States and
that of an enemy, are subject to such treatment as the necessities of
war may require.
(b) Submarine telegraphic cables between the territory of an
enemy and neutral territory may be interrupted within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the enemy or at any point outside of neutral
jurisdiction, if the necessities of war require.
(c) Submarine telegraphic cables between two neutral territories
shall be held inviolable and free from interruption.
There is no doubt, however, that this whole mailer of
the treatment of submarine telegraphic cables in time
of war should be referred to an international convention
for adjustment. So far as the present conditions are
concerned the rules as above stated accord with practice,
and while opinion is divided, some of the besl authori-
ties agree with the above rules and particularly with the
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provision that military necessity may compel interrup-
tion ontside of neutral jurisdiction. [Perels, Das inter-
national offentliche Seerecht der Gegenwart, Berlin,
1903
; p. 186.] The rules should, from the aboveand from
other reasons, read as stated until some international
agreement is devised.
(b) Should a provision in regard to wireless telegraphy
be inserted in the code ?
At the present time, the future of wireless telegraphy
is uncertain and the possibility of interruption not fully
determined. There is no reason for binding the officers
by any regulations in advance of more accurate knowl-
edge of the subject itself and of its possibilities. There-
fore the proposition to insert a provision in regard to
wireless telegraphy should not be entertained unless by
international agreement.
Article 6.
If military necessity should require it, neutral vessels
found within the limits of belligerent authority may be
seized and destroyed or otherwise utilized for military
purposes, but in such cases the owners of neutral ves-
sels must be fully recompensed. The amount of the
indemnity should, if practicable, be agreed on in advance
with the owner or master of the vessel. Due regard
must be had to treaty stipulations upon these matters.
Could a fast pleasure yacht be seized and used for a
dispatch boat under the provisions of Article 6 ?
" Military necessity, as understood by modern civil-
ized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures
which are indispensable for securing the ends of war
and which are lawful according to the modern law and
usages of war." (Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States, Article 14; Naval War
Code, Article 3.)
If military necessity exists, the fast pleasure yacht
could be seized and used for a dispatch boat without
question. A fast pleasure yacht is properly included
under the clause "neutral vessels."
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Article 7.
The use of false colors in war is forbidden, and when
summoning a vessel to lie to, or before firing a gun in
action, the national colors should be displayed by ves-
sels of the United States.
(a) Does "war," as used in Article 7, mean the period
of actual engagement in hostile action or the period from
the declaration to the termination of the war in the gen-
eral sense ?
As war throughout the code is used to indicate the
period during which the peaceful relations between
states are severed, there is no reason for giving to the word
a different interpretation at this point. Therefore, the
word does not refer to the engagement, but to the period
of hostile relationship between the states, regardless of
the issue or failure to issue a declaration.
" No one can claim, as a right, that a public declara-
tion of war shall be promulgated, unless it be the nation
by whose government it is made, and then it serves only
as a notice to their own citizens and subjects." (Blatch-
ford, Prize Cases; Betts, J., in "Hiawatha," 1.)
"The question of the point of time at which a stale
of peace gives way to a condition of war is a question
of fact. War begins with the first act of open hostili! y."
(Walker, "Science of International Law," p. 243.)
Risley, in "The Law of War," page 82, summarizes the
present position
:
The following conclusions seem to be warranted:
1. War, as affecting belligerents inter se, commences from the
date of an absolute declaration if its issue precede any act of hos-
tility. In all other cases the war dates from the commencement of
hostilities. Thus if a conditional declaration, such as an ultimatum
addressed to an offending state, is followed by war, the war will
date from the commencement of hostilities and not from the condi-
tional declaration.
.2. War, as affecting any neutral power, commences from the date
at which the neutral power has, or may reasonably be supposed to
have, knowledge of its existence. If a declaration or manifesto is
issued, the neutral's knowledge of course dates from the official
announcement ; in all other cases the conduct of neutrals is entitled
to the most favorable construction, and hostilities must have become
so open and notorious that ignorance of them on the part of the
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neutral is impossible before the liabilities attaching to their neutral
character will be enforced by the belligerents.
In modern times, however, questions as to the commencement of
war are not likely to arise, because the rapidity of communication,
the activity of the press, and the publicity accorded to all matters of
domestic and international policy combine to make the outbreak
of a war immediately known all over the world. Every state is in
fact cognizant of the precise date of its commencement, whether it
be the date of an official notification or the date of the commence-
ment of actual hostilities.
(b) Should the entire article be stricken out ?
Admitting that ' ' war " applies to the entire period of
hostile relationships, and no other interpretation can be
given, what does the Article 7 mean ?
1. The use of a false flag is forbidden during the
period of war.
2. Before or when firing a gun or engaging in action,
the flag of the United States should be displayed.
3. There is no obligation to display the flag of the
United States till the time of summoning a vessel to
lie to or till the time of action. The absence of any
flag, or the presence of a flag which is not false, is not
mentioned.
Upon 2 and 3 all authorities who refer to the subject
are agreed, i. e., that before firing a gun the true flag
must be displayed and that till such time no flag need
be raised.
There remains the question whether what many regard
as a form of perfidy is allowable up to the time of firing
a gun and is not allowable at the actual discharge of
the gun, when it would be of little or no service other
than to establish to a certainty the probable enemy
character of the vessel firing the gun. It would not be
presumed that a neutral would fire upon a belligerent
or one vessel of a belligerent upon another vessel of the
same belligerent, consequently it is held that the false
flag would be pulled down and the true flag would be
displayed at the time when the false flag would be of no
further use.
In summoning a neutral vessel to lie to the use of
true colors is necessary, however, as it establishes the
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identity of the vessel and gives evidence of its right in
time of war to interfere with neutral commerce.
The nse of false colors in land warfare has been abso-
lutely prohibited, as shown in the following.
Instructions United States Army, 18G3, Article 65
:
The use of the enemy's national standard, flag, or other emblem of
nationality, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy in battle, is an
act of perfidy by which they lose all claim to the protection of the
laws of war.
Brussels Rules, 1874, Articles 12, 13:
Art. 12. The laws of war do not allow to belligerents an unlimited
power as to the choice of means of injuring the enemy.
Art. 13. According to this principle are strictly forbidden:
(/) Abuse of the flag of truce, the national flag, or the military
insignia or uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges
of the Geneva Convention.
Oxford Manual, 1880, section 8
:
It is forbidden:
(d) To make improper use of the national flag, of signs of military
ranks, or of the uniform of the enemy, of a flag of truce, or of the
protective marks prescribed by the Convention of Geneva.
Hague Convention, Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Article XXIII
:
Besides the prohibitions provided by special conventions, it is
especially prohibited:
(/) To make improper use of a flag of truce, the national flag, or
military ensigns and the enemy's uniform, as well as the distinctive
badges of the Geneva Convention.
It has come to be the generally accepted opinion that
"deceit involving perfidy should be forbidden."
The flag is the emblem held most esteemed and sacred
among states. It is the usual method of showing alle-
giance and is to be raised only on sufficient authority.
The use of false colors on land or similar perfidy de-
prives the users of the
'
' claim to protection of the laws
of war."
It is evident that the use of false colors in warfare on
the sea may bring about results very different from t hose
which would follow warfare in which false colors were
prohibited. Pillet has proposed the establishment of a
40
zone into which no vessel may come without establish-
ing its identity. He says
:
Les transformations de rarmement maritime ont rendu cette regie
traditionnelle tout a fait insuffisante au point de vue de la securite
des belligerants. II est possible, en effet, qu'un navire de guerre
ennemi ne hisse son veritable pavilion qu'au moment precis ou il
lache la bordee qui mettra son adversaire hors de combat; il est pos-
sible surtout, qu'un torpilleur s'approche a bonne portee, puis arbore
ses couleurs et immediatement lance une torpille contre laquelle le
navire vise ne pourra pas toujours se proteger. La tolerance admise
quant au pavilion peut ainsi avoir pour consequence des surprises
fatales, surprises que cette seule tolerance permet de pratiquer. Ce
n'est evidemment pas pour obtenir de tels resultats que la liberte
ancienne a ete admise, et on ne prevoyait pas, au moment ou cette
coutume s'est formee, que la rapidite de certains navires et la puis-
sance de leurs engins de destruction permettraient ainsi de miner
un vaisseau de guerre avant meme qu'il put savoir qu'il etait en
presence d'un ennemi. Pour remedier a cet inconvenient qui est
grave il conviendrait de s'attacher a une idee emise autrefois par
quelques auteurs (De Cussy, Causes celebres du droit des gens, 1 liv.,
Ill, sec. 60; Hautefeuille, Histoire des origines, p. 23; Bluntschli,
Volkerrecht, sec. 318; Phillimore, Commentaries upon international
law, t. 1, sec. 203) et de conferer aux navires de guerre des bellig-
erants le droit de juridiction sur une certaine zone (de trois milles
de rayon par exemple) dont chaque navire serait le centre, et dans
laquelle aucun vaisseau de guerre ne pourrait entrer sans se faire
reconnaitre, a peine d'etre traite comme ennemi. II est a souhaiter
que les Puissances maritimes s'occupent de cette difficulte, et qi 'une
convention internationale soit signee qui consacre la solution que
nous proposons. (Les Lois Actuelles de la Guerre, 2d ed., p. 144.)
Hall makes the following statement of snch rules as
allow false colors
:
A curious arbitrary rule affects one class of strategems by forbid-
ding certain permitted means of deception from the moment at
which they cease to deceive. It is perfectly legitimate to use the
distinctive emblems of an enemy in order to escape from him or to
draw his forces into action; but it is held that soldiers clothed in the
uniforms of their enemy must put on a conspicuous mark by which
they can be recognized before attacking, and that a vessel using the
enemy's flag must hoist its own flag before firing with shot or shell.
The rule, disobedience to which is considered to entail grave dis-
honor, has been based on the statement that "in actual battle,
enemies are bound to combat loyally and are not free to insure vic-
tory by putting on a mask of friendship.'' In war upon land victory
might be so insured, and the rule is consequently sensible; but at
sea, and the prohibition is spoken of generally with reference to
maritime war, the mask of friendship no longer misleads when
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once fighting begins, and it is not easy to see why it is more dis-
loyal to wear a disguise when it is obviously useless, than when it
serves its purpose. (Hall, International Law, 4th ed., p. 558.)
The use of " false colors " is evidently subject to much
difference of opinion. (See Perels, Seerecht ger Gegen-
wart, p. 182.) JSTo scheme of such use has been pro-
posed which seems satisfactory, and it is difficult to see
how honorable warfare can be conducted upon such a
basis as is implied in the use of false colors. Undoubt-
edly, the rule prohibiting the use of false colors in war
should be made with definite provisions in regard to
legitimate ruses in maritime warfare.
It is, however, the opinion of the officers in conference
upon this subject that the United States, without a simi-
lar provision against the use of false colors by other
States, would be put at great disadvantage in time of
war through the existence of this prohibition in the
United States Naval War Code. The officers were then -
fore almost unanimously (one dissenting) of the opinion
that this rule should be stricken from the code pending
some international agreement upon the use of "false
colors."
(c) Should all of the article following the word ' ' for-
bidden " be stricken out ?
If the article is retained, the words following ' ' for-
bidden " in Article 7 are necessary as specifying at what
time the national colors should be displayed, while dur-
ing the period preceding there is no prohibition of the
use of emblems that are not in the category of false
colors, nor objection to sailing without a flag.
(d) Could a torpedo boat approach near an enemy
ship under false colors and then raising true colors
launch a torpedo against its opponent ?
Under the present rules there would be no difference
in the application of the rule to a torpedo or other
vessel.
(e) One author says, "A ship may by employing false
colors attempt to escape pursuit on the part of the
enemy or perhaps even force a blockade; but it is abso-
lutely forbidden by the regulations as well as by the
usages of war to engage in hostilities under a false flag
;
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violation of this rule would be inexcusable even in the
case of the most pressing necessity." How far is this
position correct and in what respects is it incorrect?
This situation falls into three divisions, (1) the use of
false colors to escape pursuit, (2) to force a blockade,
and (3) to engage in hostilities.
(1) The use of false colors to evade pursuit has gen-
erally been held as allowable. It must be remembered,
however, that this escape of an enemy vessel under
false colors may add just so much to the fighting force
of the enemy by so much delaying the realization of the
end of war, viz, "the complete submission of the enemy
at the earliest possible moment."
(2) The forcing of a blockade under false colors is
generally regarded as an act of war and therefore for-
bidden. This seems to be the more reasonable opinion
and the opinion which the fact sustains. The passing
of a blockade by a public ship of a neutral is a courtesy
allowed on the part of the blockading fleet. A neutral
should not be put under suspicion because it is allowable
for an enemy to use his flag. The consequences of this
form of deceit so directly affect the neutral that such
use of the flag should be forbidden.
(3) The remaining portion of the quotation is in
accord with the best opinion and would be universally
upheld.
It is the final opinion that Article 7 should be made
the subject of international agreement or else should be
repealed.
Article 8.
In the event of an enemy failing to observe the laws
and usages of war, if the offender is beyond reach, resort
may be had to reprisals, if such action should be con-
sidered a necessity ; but due regard must always be had
to the duties of humanity. Reprisals should not exceed
in severity the offense committed, and must not be re-
sorted to when the injury complained of has been
repaired.
If the offender is within the power of the United
States he can be punished, after due trial, by a properly
constituted military or naval tribunal. Such offenders
are liable to the punishments specified by the criminal
law.
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(a) In fourth line of Article 8, should the word "mili-
tary " be inserted before the word "necessity?"
No, because in general cases where reprisals would be
resorted to, such actions would not be because of mili-
tary necessity, but rather for disciplinary purposes in
order that the laws and usages of war might subse-
quently be observed, e. g., when uncivilized peoples do
not observe these rules.
Action in the nature of reprisal against civilized
enemies should be sanctioned by the general government
and not undertaken by a subordinate officer unless a
military necessity requires, as there are other means for
the treatment of civilized enemies.
(b) A prominent authority says, ' ' Reprisal is an act
of vengeance pure and simple and should be wholly
proscribed or at least reserved for wars undertaken
against the uncivilized who have no notion of the law
of nations and are accessible only to the feeling of
fear." Is this a proper statement of the fact and should
the whole of Article 8 be stricken out?
This is not a correct statement of fact as reprisals are
now viewed, though reprisals may sometimes be acts of
vengeance. This is the general continental point of
view, however. The English and American point of view
is that reprisals are undertaken to secure redress for in-
juries and usually are aimed against property or inter-
course, rarely against persons.
Article 8 is however greatly restricted as Been in its
provisions for reprisals
:
1. For violation of "laws and usages of war," one
specific cause.
2. By an "offender beyond reach."
3. In case of "necessity" only.
4. Within duties of "humanity."
5. Proportioned to offense.
6. Only in case of "injury not repaired."
7. Outside power of the United States.
Upon this debatable question of reprisals, an almost
wholly obsolete form of action, probably it would have
been better to refrain from utterance, but in view of the
fact that the article has been issued, it may be well to
leave it unchanged.
